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ABSTRACT
What makes people join a political party is one of the most commonly
studied questions in research on party members. Nearly all this research,
however, is based on talking to people who have actually joined parties. This
article simultaneously analyses surveys of members of political parties in
Britain and surveys of non-member supporters of those same parties. This
uniquely enables us to model the decision to join parties. The results suggest
that most of the elements that constitute the influential ‘General Incentives
Model’ are significant. But it also reveals that, while party supporters imagine
that selective benefits, social norms and opposing rival parties’ policies are
key factors in members’ decisions to join a party, those who actually do so
are more likely to say they are motivated by attachments to their party’s
values, policies and leaders, as well as by an altruistic desire to support
democracy more generally.
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Since Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley first launched their seminal research
programme on political party members (Seyd and Whiteley 1992;
Whiteley et al. 1994, 2006), their ‘General Incentives Model’ (GIM) has
become a widely accepted approach in comparative politics to under-
standing why some citizens in liberal democracies join political parties
and become active within them (see van Haute and Gauja 2015). Indeed,
one might almost refer to it as conventional wisdom or orthodoxy, and it
has certainly spawned a host of emulations and adaptations to other
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settings by scholars around the democratic world and in Western Europe
in particular (see, for instance, Clarke et al. 2000; Gallagher and Marsh
2002; Ridder et al. 2015; Spier and Klein 2015).
The standard way of testing the validity of the GIM approach has been
to survey party members and ask them questions pertaining to the varia-
bles at the heart of the model. This is problematic. There are always limi-
tations to any research undertaking, of course, but one in particular has
constrained work on party members: namely that the survey approach has
generated no variation on a key dependent variable – party membership
itself. While it remains possible to examine interesting descriptive statistics
on who the members are and what reasons they give for joining parties,
surveys of party members which by definition exclude non-members render
multivariate modelling of membership itself impossible. This article fills that
gap. By combining recent, simultaneous surveys of members and non-member
supporters of parties (i.e. voters who strongly identify with a party but do not
go as far as to formally join it) into a single integrated dataset, we achieve vari-
ation on the key dependent variable, allowing us to properly explore the initial
decision to join. We are thus able for the first time to model party membership
properly: why do some people who are strongly supportive of particular parties
choose to belong to them while others prefer not to?
The General Incentives Model
We start with a brief recap of the GIM – an approach
grounded in the assumption that participation occurs in response to different
kinds of incentives … but it goes beyond a narrowly cast economic analysis
of incentives to include emotional attachments to the party, moral concerns,
and social norms, variables which lie outside the standard cost-benefit
approach to decision-making. (Whiteley et al. 1994: 109)
To summarise the model (first set out in Seyd and Whiteley 1992: 112),
it incorporates a combination of the following core General Incentives to
join a party:
 The respondent’s perception of the probability that participation in
group activity through the party will achieve a desired collective out-
come; in other words, the respondent’s sense of group efficacy.
 The respondent’s desired collective policy outcome, such as the intro-
duction of a particular policy.
 The respondent’s assessment of the selective outcome benefits of activ-
ism; that is, material or career benefits.
 The respondent’s assessment of the selective process benefits of activism;
that is, the intrinsic pleasure derived from involvement in political action.
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 The respondent’s altruistic motivations for activism.
 The respondent’s perception of social norm incentives for activism;
that is, the desire to conform with the behaviour and expectations of
personal contacts;
 The respondent’s expressive or affective motivations for activism, such
as the strength of commitment to or identification with a given party
or leader.
 The respondent’s perception of the costs of activism; properly speak-
ing, this is a disincentive.
In addition to these core features of the GIM, there are two others
which are also added to the explanatory mix in some versions of the work
of Seyd and Whiteley, although they are not unique in their approach:
 The respondent’s belief that individual acts can influence and have a
real impact upon political decisions; that is, the respondent’s sense of
personal efficacy.
 The respondent’s ideological motivations for activism.
These incentives have been prominent in descriptive data on the
memberships of the Labour Party (Seyd and Whiteley 1992), the
Conservatives (Whiteley et al. 1994) and the Liberal Democrats
(Whiteley et al. 2006). Although some time has passed since this
research was conducted, there is no obvious reason to suppose that the
factors motivating people to join parties might be time-dependent, so we
would broadly expect that the same factors will prove to be significant
in explaining why some partisans decide to become members, whereas
others remain non-member supporters. Seyd, Whiteley and their various
collaborators were unable to move beyond descriptive findings – highly
suggestive though they undoubtedly were – but our new dataset allows
us to model the decision to join properly. How well does the GIM per-
form when tested in this way?
Data, measures and expectations
Overall, in our Party Members Project (PMP) dataset there are 12,079
respondents who, straight after the 2015 elections, identified strongly with
one of the six political parties in our study, namely Labour, Conservative,
Liberal Democrat, UKIP, Greens and the SNP. Among them, 5700 did go
as far as formally joining a party, whereas 6379 did not.1 Henceforth, we
will refer to the former as party members and to the latter as party sup-
porters.2 Our aim is to identify the key drivers that lead party identifiers
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to become formal members of a party. Although we cannot investigate
this in a causal way (as, theoretically, one could through a panel, for
example), we can make some reasonable assumptions about what is likely
to have led some respondents to join a party, and we can test these
assumptions by looking at the key factors that help us predict which of
the respondents in our dataset are party members and which are ‘only’
party supporters.
In addition to examining the impact of core GIM factors, we also look at
whether standard socio-demographics have any influence on why people
join parties, along with ideology and personal efficacy, which are all well-
known predictors of ‘high-intensity’ forms of political participation such as
party membership. We know from long-established research that resources
are crucial when it comes to participation and so assume that this is also
the case when it comes to party membership. These personal ‘resource’
attributes are central to the Civic Voluntarism approach, one of the most
widely cited models of general political participation in political science. It
originates with work on US participation by Verba and Nie (1972) and has
since been applied in other countries, including Britain (Barnes and Kaase
1979; Parry et al. 1992; Verba et al. 1978, 1993). In a nutshell, this model
claims that there are three reasons why people do not become politically
active: ‘because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody
asked. In other words, people may be inactive because they lack resources,
because they lack psychological engagement with politics, or because they
are outside of the recruitment networks that bring people into politics’
(Verba et al. 1995: 269). In particular, resources such as access to education
and/or suitable jobs provide people with the chance to develop the organisa-
tional and communication skills that are relevant to political participation,
as does being embedded in non-political social networks like churches. In
truth, the GIM and Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) approaches are not
completely independent of one another, since the influence of the latter’s
social networks is implicit in the former’s selective process and social norm
effects. So, while it is not the aim of this article to test the CVM as such, in
controlling for demographics and personal political efficacy, we are in effect
recognising that GIM builds not only on rational choice individualism, but
also incorporates key elements of the civic voluntarism approach in explain-
ing the decision to join political parties.
On the basis of these prior findings, we therefore start by examining
the impact of demographic resources, and expect partisans with higher
levels of education and social class, as well as men, to be more likely to
be members of a party; we do not, however, have any specific expecta-
tions about whether members are more likely to be younger or older than
party supporters.
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We then go on to consider the impact of ideology and personal polit-
ical efficacy, employing normalised scales that, unless otherwise stated,
run from low (0) to high (10). Ideological incentives are measured by ref-
erence to various attitudinal scales which tap ideological dimensions
widely recognised as salient features of contemporary British politics. The
first is based on a well-known left–right scale drawing on a battery of
questions that have routinely been asked of respondents to the British
Election Study (and other surveys) since the 1990s (Heath et al 1993).3
The left–right additive scale runs from 0 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing)
and the scale items from which it is constructed produce a very high
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient (0.88 for party supporters; 0.91 for
party members). Following the well-known ‘law’ of curvilinear disparity
(May 1973), we would infer that party members are likely to be more rad-
ical than party supporters and that this ideological impulse is a motiv-
ation for joining parties. Thus, members of parties generally recognised as
being on the left of British politics at the time the data was gathered in
2015 (Labour, Greens, Liberal Democrats and SNP) are expected to stand
more to the left of the party average than party supporters, whereas mem-
bers of parties on the right (Conservatives and UKIP), are expected to
stand more to the right of the party average compared to party support-
ers. Although one of the two parties that we have designated ‘right-wing’
– UKIP – is actually only properly so described on questions of identity
and social authority rather than on questions of political economy (Webb
and Bale 2014), we still expect that members will be more likely to stand
to the right of the party average compared to party supporters. We look
at this through a variable measuring the extent to which party members
and supporters stand at the extreme of their own party. After calculating
the average left–right score for members and supporters of each party, we
then calculate the difference between each individual respondent and this
overall party left–right average; we are thus able to construct a single
variable measuring proximity to the party’s ideological extremity, as it
takes on positive values for positions to the left of the party average
for parties on the left and to the right of the party average for parties
on the right (Conservatives and UKIP). Negative values would indicate
more centrist positions.
The second ideological indicator we focus on is an additive scale (also
designed by Heath and his colleagues) to tap respondents’ positions on
questions of social liberalism and authoritarianism (with 0 representing
the liberal end of the scale and 10 the authoritarian end).4 This is also
eminently reliable (alpha ¼ 0.82 for party supporters and 0.84 for party
members). In this case, although it is likely that members and supporters
of parties on the left are more socially liberal than those on the right, we
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expect that, on the whole, party members will be more socially liberal
than party supporters. This is because social liberalism is a value that pla-
ces greater emphasis on democratic engagement as a civic right and a
means of maximising liberty while enhancing political knowledge and
personal development (Howarth 2007).
We also employ a measure of personal political efficacy. This is the
respondent’s perception of the probability that their personal participation
will achieve a desired collective outcome, and is not to be confused with the
respondent’s sense of group efficacy. Although not one of the core general
incentives for party membership (Whiteley et al. 1994: 96–7), we know from
the CVM that an individual’s perception that political change is possible and
that they can play a role in effecting such change is a driver of participation
(Rosenston and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995). The more individuals feel
they are politically competent, the more they will be willing to participate in
politics, and we believe this is particularly the case for high-level participa-
tion such as party membership. We therefore look, too, at the respondent’s
perception of the probability that their personal participation will achieve a
desired collective outcome. Political efficacy is measured by the degree of
agreement or disagreement with two Likert-scale statements: ‘politicians
don’t care what people like me think’ and ‘people like me can have a real
influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved’. We expect party
members to have a higher sense of personal efficacy than party supporters.
We now turn to core GIM predictors. Unless otherwise stated,
responses for each of these predictors have been added together, normal-
ised and coded into combined scales where 0 represents a low incentive
and 10 represents a high incentive These start with a measure of group
efficacy, which rests on the claim that party supporters are more likely to
join a party when they also have a high perception of probable group influ-
ence through their membership. We measure this with a combined index
created from the degree of agreement/disagreement with two Likert-scale
statements: ‘when party members work together, they can really change
the local community or country’, and ‘the party leadership doesn’t pay a
lot of attention to ordinary party members’. We therefore expect party
members to have a higher sense of group efficacy than party supporters.
A further factor derived from the GIM is the respondent’s expressive or
affective motivations for activism. This is gauged through respondents’
strength of partisan identification, running from not very strong to very
strong. We expect members to have higher perceived expressive motiva-
tions for activism than party supporters. The next GIM predictor included
in our model is altruistic incentives for activism. This is measured by
response to the Likert-scale statement: ‘Every citizen should get involved
in politics if democracy is to work properly’. We expect members to be
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more likely to agree with this statement, and therefore to have higher
altruistic incentives than party supporters.
Joining a party may also be the result of more narrowly self-centred
drives, of course. GIM theory suggests that some might be motivated to
formally join a party because of rewards or gratifications that flow only to
members. This is the case with the respondent’s assessment of the selective
outcome benefits of activism. Such benefits are typically related to career
or material ambitions. In other words, membership is seen as a necessary
path to a particular outcome that will benefit them personally – for
instance, a career in electoral politics. It is measured by looking at the
degree of agreement with the statement ‘a person like me could do a
good job of being a local councillor or MP’. In addition, the respondent’s
assessment of the selective process benefits of activism might also be a sig-
nificant factor; here, the gratification restricted to the members is
achieved through the process of participation, such as enjoyment of inter-
action with other (like-minded) people. Here it is measured by looking at
the degree of agreement with the statement ‘being a party member is a
good way to meet people’. We expect members to be more likely to agree
with these statements and therefore to have higher perceived selective
outcome and selective process benefits of activism than party supporters.
Joining a party also comes down to social norms, or, in other words,
the pressure to conform to the influence of other people in being willing
to join a party (Whiteley 1995). This is something that could be com-
pared to what, in the CVM, has been described as the network and
mobilisation factor (Verba et al. 1995). In other words, those who are not
so embedded in wider political action networks are less likely to be mobi-
lised into party membership. We therefore operationalise social norm
pressure with a dichotomous variable indicating whether the partisan is
already a member of other non-political or semi-political organisations,
such as trade unions, Greenpeace (for environmentalists) or Saga (for
retirees and seniors). We expect party members to be more likely than
party supporters to be members of other civil society organisations.
Last but not least, partisans might also be disincentivised to join a
party by the perceived costs of activism. This is measured by a simple
Likert-scale question about whether respondents agree or disagree with
the idea that: ‘party activism often takes time away from one’s family’.
Once again, the index runs from low costs (0) to high costs (10). Since,
in the case of costs of activism, we are dealing with disincentives to
becoming a party member, rather than incentives, we expect members to
perceive the costs of activism as lower than do party supporters.
Finally, it should be noted that, due to an absence of equivalent indica-
tors in the party members and party supporters survey, we cannot here
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include a measure for collective policy incentives. We would argue in any
case that collective policy incentives often closely parallel general ideo-
logical positions, so the lack of these indicators in our model should not
represent a threat to the validity of the results.5
Results
We start with a review of the descriptive statistics in Table 1. How do
members and supporters compare and contrast in terms of these demo-
graphic and general incentives factors? The first thing that strikes one in
reviewing the table is that the differences between members and support-
ers are significant for all variables, demographic and attitudinal, although
the mean age difference (51 for party members to 52 for party supporters)
seems too small to warrant serious consideration as an important explan-
ation of why people might join parties. The members are notably more
male, middle class and educated than supporters, however, showing that
socio-demographic resources could be an important factor in party mem-
bership. As expected, party members are also less moderate than party
supporters: in left-of-centre parties members are more left-wing than sup-
porters, whereas they are more right-wing in right-of-centre parties. This
Table 1. Social and political characteristics of British political party members and
supporters, 2015.
Attribute Supporters Members N Significance
Mean age 52 51 12,069 
% male 48.0 65.0 12,072 
% graduates 32.1 46.2 11,780 
% ABC1 59.1 77.6 11,914 
Mean left–right
Left parties 1.99 1.75 7,660 
Conservative Party 5.08 6.34 2,264 
UKIP 2.62 3.59 1,790 
Mean left–right extremism
Left parties –0.09 0.08 7,660 
Conservative Party –0.62 0.64 2,264 
UKIP –0.41 0.56 1,790 
Mean liberty–authority
Left parties 5.40 3.93 7,317 
Conservative Party 7.39 6.58 2,232 
UKIP 7.97 7.54 1,790 
All parties 6.22 4.99 11,339 
Personal efficacy 4.18 6.28 11,758 
Group efficacy 5.13 7.33 10,855 
Expressive incentives 6.34 8.28 12,053 
Altruism 5.80 7.07 11,649 
Selective process 5.76 7.15 11,076 
Selective outcome 5.11 6.54 11,130 
% Social norms 29.6 48.2 12,071 
Cost of activism 6.87 6.44 11,001 
Source: PMP;  p< 0.05;  p< 0.01;  p< 0.001.
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is apparent in both the basic left–right index scores and the ‘left–right
extremism’ scores in Table 1.6 However, and once again as expected,
members are more socially liberal than supporters in both left- and right-
wing parties. Members also have a decidedly greater sense of personal
political efficacy than do supporters. All of this meets our hypothetical
expectations.
When we look at the core GIM incentives measures, it is apparent that
members outscore supporters on incentives such as group efficacy,
expressive ideals, altruistic concerns for the wellbeing of the political sys-
tem, and on the selective outcome and process incentives of membership.
That is, members have a far more prominent expressive belief in the
ability of particular parties, as well as in the ability of party members, to
effect political change within a community; they are also much likelier to
rationalise their membership in terms of a high-minded desire to contrib-
ute to the healthy functioning of democracy. At the same time, however,
members are also more likely to think that being a party member is a
good way to meet like-minded people as well as a way to potentially fulfil
an ambition (latent or manifest) to become a politician. Moreover, mem-
bers are more likely to respond to social norms as they are part of a
wider network of civil society organisations. Finally, however, it is sup-
porters who perceive the cost of party activism (in terms of the time they
presume it takes up) to be higher than members, who know how much
time it involves. Again, all of these descriptive findings conform with our
expectations.
Thus far, emulating the approach of previous researchers by examining
descriptive statistics seems to confirm the continuing validity of the GIM
today. But how do these explanations fare in the context of a multivariate
model? This is where this article can add real value to existing research.
Table 2 reports the results of a logistic regression model in which the
dependent variable is party member (1)/non-member supporter (0). The
first model (M1) looks at whether socio-demographic resources, personal
political efficacy and ideology help explain which partisans are more likely
to have become members of a party. The second model (M2) introduces
the core GIM factors.
We see from Model 1 that something that was apparent in Table 1 is
confirmed: all of the predictors have a statistically significant bearing on
the decision to become a party member, and in the expected direction.
This offers broad confirmation of the importance of personal resources,
political efficacy and ideology. Holding all other factors constant, party
members are significantly more likely to be male, middle class, educated
and older than supporters. Party members also have a significantly stron-
ger sense of political efficacy than non-members; quite whether this ‘can-
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do’ mentality is something that drives them to join parties or whether
involvement in party activity has enhanced their sense of political efficacy
is a causal puzzle that has long been discussed in the wider literature of
political participation (e.g. Finkel 1985) and one that, sadly, our data can-
not unravel; that said, both are plausible explanations – and, indeed, ele-
ments of both may be behind this finding. Moreover, those who hold
more extreme positions compared to their party average (on the left for
left-wing parties and on the right for right-wing parties) have higher
probabilities of being party members rather than party supporters.
Finally, M1 confirms that party members, regardless of the ideological
inclination of their party, are, on average, more socially liberal than
party supporters.
If we turn to Model 2 (M2), we see that the addition of the core
GIM factors does not alter the direction of any the demographic or
ideological predictors in M1. In addition to Model 1, we also see
confirmation that those who join parties rather than remain mere sup-
porters are significantly more likely to score highly in terms of group
efficacy, expressive orientations towards parties, altruistic motivations
for political engagement, selective outcome and process motivations;
they are also more likely to be involved in other civil society organisa-
tions. But, as expected, members are less likely than supporters to
regard the opportunity cost of the time involved in membership as
being high.
Table 2. Logistic regression of party membership, 2015.
M1 M2
(N¼ 8714) (N¼ 8714)
B SE B SE
Male 0.63 0.05 0.81 0.06
Graduate 0.18 0.06 0.30 0.07
Age 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02
Social grade 0.52 0.06 0.63 0.07
Socially liberal/authoritarian (0–10) 0.18 0.01 0.20 0.02
Left–right extremism (8.5/7) 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.02
Personal efficacy (0–10) 0.54 0.01 0.26 0.02
Group efficacy (0–10) 0.48 0.02
Expressive incentive (Very strong vs. Fairly strong party id) 1.45 0.06
Altruism (0–10) 0.10 0.01
Selective outcome (0–10) 0.05 0.01
Selective process (0–10) 0.13 0.02
Social norms (member of other organisations vs. non-member) 0.83 0.06
Cost of activism 0.10 0.02
Constant 2.26 0.18 8.97 0.32
Pseudo-R2 25.6 44.5
Source: PMP;  p< 0.05;  p< 0.01;  p< 0.001.
Note: A control for parties has been included in the two models but is not shown here in order to
simplify presentation.
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 165
In short, the factors that clearly distinguish members from supporters,
and may go furthest in explaining why they bother to join up, are being
male, better educated and coming from higher up the social hierarchy
(i.e. having more resources), being socially liberal and ideologically more
radical (for parties on the left), having a strong sense of personal and
collective political efficacy, strong expressive belief in a particular party
and altruistic belief in the wider importance of political participation, a
perception of the value of selective process and outcome benefits, involve-
ment in other civil society organisations, and not being overly deterred by
the time commitment of being a member. This amounts to clear confirm-
ation of the continuing relevance of the GIM explanation of party mem-
bership in the twenty-first century.
Differing narratives of party membership: members
versus supporters
While we now have convincing confirmation of the general incentives
explanation for party membership, we can extend our knowledge by fur-
ther investigating the different narratives that members and supporters
develop about their reasons for joining. Do non-joiners have realistic
expectations of why people decide to join a party? Is it possible that they
maintain rather different beliefs to those held by members, which then
serve to disincentivise them from joining? One way of shedding light on
this possibility is by asking supporters a series of analogous questions
about why people might join parties. The two models presented so far
(M1 and M2) are based solely on identical questions that have been asked
of both members and supporters. However, we also asked the latter a
number of questions that varied slightly from those asked of members.
Party members were asked questions relating to the importance of a series
of motivations for joining a party, for which they were able to draw
directly on their own experience of membership in answering. However,
for obvious reasons, non-member supporters could not draw on that
experience. Instead, we asked supporters questions with analogous, but
different, wordings. Thus, whereas party members were asked ‘How
important were the following reasons for joining the party?’, supporters
were asked: ‘The following are reasons people who join political parties
sometimes give for joining them. Thinking about the type of people who
join political parties and why you think they do so, please rate the
importance of each one’. Asking supporters questions about why they
think some people join parties, rather than why actually they did join par-
ties, allows us to compare whether supporters’ perceptions are similar
to members’ reported motivations. This is interesting because it sheds
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light on whether supporters have what, from the point of view of party
members, might be inaccurate ideas about party membership; should this
prove to be the case, it might point to further reasons why they have
elected not to join a party despite thinking a great deal of it.
There are six possible motivations that we can address in this way:
expressive incentives (‘An attachment to the party’s principles’ and ‘Belief
in the party’s leadership’), collective incentives (‘To support the party’s
general policies or a specific policy that mattered greatly to me’ and ‘To
oppose the policies of a rival party, or the power of a social or economic
group, such as big business or unions’), altruism (‘To support the demo-
cratic process’ and ‘To promote the interests of the nation’), social norms
(‘The influence of family, friends or colleagues’), selective process (‘Being
able to engage in activities in which you would be mixing with other like-
minded individuals’) and selective outcome (‘To enhance their career’).
The results reported in Table 3 are highly suggestive. In a number of
cases, they show that party members score more highly in response to the
‘direct’ questions put to them than supporters do to the analogous, coun-
terpart questions. That is, members see expressive incentives, collective
positive incentives and altruistic motivations as being more important
reasons for party membership than supporters imagine them to be.
However, the reverse is true in respect of several other factors. Supporters
are slightly more likely to imagine that opposing a rival party’s policies is
important than members actually feel to be the case. More obviously,
though, supporters clearly regard selective process and (particularly) out-
come incentives, as well as the pressure of social norms, as likely to be of
greater importance than members actually acknowledge.
Thus, party supporters believe that party members must derive intrin-
sic pleasure from involvement in party life, and career or material
Table 3. Comparing perceptions of membership incentives though direct and analo-
gous questions.
Supporters Members Significance
Expressive incentives
Attachment to party’s principles 8.24 9.21 
Belief in party’s leadership 7.73 7.89 
Collective incentives
Support policies 8.30 9.20 
Oppose policies 7.82 7.72 
Altruism
Support democratic process 7.17 8.56 
Promote national interest 6.88 8.88 
Selective process 7.55 5.59 
Selective outcome 6.49 2.06 
Social norms 5.71 2.98 
Source: PMP;  p< 0.05;  p< 0.01;  p< 0.001. N¼ 12,069.
Note: Highlighted incentives are those which supporters score more highly than members.
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benefits, and that they must be embedded in a social network that draws
them into the party. Actual members are far less likely to believe that this
is the case – especially with respect to selective outcomes or social
norms.7 Hence, we have evidence of the different understandings or narra-
tives of what party membership actually entails: while supporters imagine –
perhaps somewhat cynically – that opposing rivals’ policies, meeting like-
minded people, and selective outcomes are key factors in the decision to
join, party members are more likely to believe that they are motivated by
rather high-minded attachments to party principles, policies and leaders,
and by a desire to support the democratic process and the national interest.
Of course, whether this means that members really are more altruistic
and principled than supporters, or that they are merely in denial about
the true significance of the potential material or career benefits they hope
(or hoped) to gain from party membership, is ultimately impossible to
tell; it is known that ‘[c]onscious deliberation and rumination is … the
rationalization of multiple unconscious processes that recruit reasons to
justify and explains beliefs, attitudes and actions’ (Lodge and Taber 2013:
22), so we must regard these results with a general caveat concerning the
subjective and often cognitively biased nature of attitudes. Even so, the
findings do seem to provide a strong clue as to the gap in perception that
distinguishes members from supporters. In other words, if supporters do
not believe they themselves are driven by the same motives as party mem-
bers, and/or if they find those motives somehow off-putting, they are
probably less likely to become members themselves.
Conclusion
In this article, we have sought to test the widely cited General Incentives
Model of party membership using a unique dataset that combines both
party members and non-member supporters to explore what distinguishes
the two sets of partisans when it comes to the decision to join the party.
We have seen that the GIM largely stands up well: all of the factors that
constitute the model turn out to be significant and to impact on the deci-
sion to join in ways that the GIM would predict. A strong sense of per-
sonal and collective political efficacy, an expressive belief in a party and
an altruistic commitment to the wider importance of political participa-
tion, a sense of the value of selective process and outcome benefits,
involvement in a wider set of civil society organisations that bring social
norm pressures with them, and not being deterred by the implicit time
commitments, all impel people to join up. Being more ideologically rad-
ical than the average (strong) party supporter in left–right terms also
makes people more likely to join parties, as does being more socially
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liberal, which is in keeping with the emphasis such individuals place on
democratic engagement. Thus, the general array of factors that might
incentivise an individual to join a political party, in conjunction with the
social and psychological resources that have widely been held to facilitate
political participation more generally, can be confirmed by our study as
being directly important.
Through comparison of responses to direct and analogous questions
put respectively to members and non-member supporters, we have also
identified the impact of the different narratives of party membership
maintained by these two groups. While supporters imagine that selective
benefits, social norms and opposing rival party policies are key factors in
the decision to join, those who actually join a party are more likely to
believe that they are motivated by principled attachments to its values,
policies and leaders, and by an altruistic desire to support the democratic
process and the national interest.
This has practical implications. By respectfully and sensitively challenging
supporters’ narratives about members – perhaps by encouraging activists to
talk more about the realities of membership wherever possible – political
parties may be able to convert more supporters into members. Research on
the campaigning contributions of both groups in the era of the ‘multi-speed
membership party’ (Scarrow 2015) suggests that doing so may not be as
essential in terms of electioneering as is commonly imagined (Webb et al.
2017). However, it could still be extremely valuable in terms of, for instance,
party legitimacy, candidate recruitment and organisational presence (K€olln
2015) – particularly when, outside of the UK anyway, membership in many
political parties still seems to be dropping like a stone (van Biezen
et al. 2012).
Notes
1. YouGov recruited the survey respondents from a panel of around 300,000
volunteers who are paid a small reward for completing a survey. Upon
joining the YouGov panel volunteers complete a survey asking a broad
range of demographic questions which are subsequently used to recruit
respondents matching desired demographic quotas for surveys. Potential
respondents for the party member survey were identified from questions
asking respondents if they were members of any of a list of large membership
organisations, including the political parties. Results reported in this article are
not weighted in any way since there are no known official population
parameters for the various party memberships. However, previous YouGov
party membership surveys using unweighted data have generated predictions
for party leadership contests that came very close to (that is within 1% of) the
final official outcome, which gives us confidence in the quality of the data.
2. Note that ‘supporters’ in this article should not be confused with those who
are officially ‘registered supporters’ of the Labour Party. This is a new category
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of party adherent that was introduced under Ed Miliband’s leadership; while it
is possible that some of those who fall into our party supporters category
actually are registered Labour supporters, the overwhelming majority will not
be – not least because not all British parties have similar schemes. We have
therefore not sought to treat officially registered supporters as a separate
category for the purposes of our analysis.
3. The individual items on which these scales are based are as follows: Please
tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who
are less well-off; Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers;
Ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth; There is
one law for the rich and one for the poor; Management will always try to
get the better of employees if it gets the chance. Respondents could select
from the following options in answering each of these questions: (1)
Strongly agree; (2) Tend to agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Tend
to disagree (5) Strongly disagree; (6) Don’t know. Don’t knows are excluded
from analysis, and all left–right item responses are coded so that 1 is the
most left-wing option, and 5 the most right-wing option. These scores have
then been normalised to a scale running from 0 (left) to right (10).
4. The individual items from which the liberty–authority scale is constructed
(in similar fashion to the left–right scale) are as follows: Young people today
don’t have enough respect for traditional values; People who break the law
should be given stiffer sentences; For some crimes the death penalty is the
most appropriate sentence; Schools should teach children to obey authority;
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.
0¼ liberal, 10¼ authoritarian.
5. Note that we are, however, able to consider the impact of collective policy
incentives in the ‘different narratives’ section of this article (see Table 3).
6. Note that the overall left–right combined mean scores for members and
supporters are as follows: Conservative 5.7, Labour 1.5, Liberal Democrat
2.99, UKIP 3.03, Greens 1.46, SNP 1.69.
7. This is so even though political careerists may have become proportionately
more significant in the context of long-term membership decline.
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